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Abstract
Laws are experienced, and produced, with and through bodies. By this, I mean the prohibitions,
permissions, rights, and duties often understood as shaping the topology of a social community, amount
to more than a system of rules incorporated in mental schema. Laws exist in dialectical relation with
agents who construct, rely upon, and find meaning in law, and that dialectical relation is a consequence of
both the representations agents impose upon social order and the material conditions of their
environment that inform or otherwise give shape to their social practices. That environment, in which the
legal actor is emplaced, includes both physical and social phenomena in actual space and the
corporeality of the body.
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Book Review

Embodying Punishment: Emotions,
Identities, and Lived Experiences
in Women’s Prisons, by Anastasia
Chamberlen1
JOSHUA SHAW2
LAWS ARE EXPERIENCED, AND PRODUCED, with and through bodies. By this,

I mean the prohibitions, permissions, rights, and duties often understood as
shaping the topology of a social community, amount to more than a system
of rules incorporated in mental schema. Laws exist in dialectical relation with
agents who construct, rely upon, and fnd meaning in law, and that dialectical
relation is a consequence of both the representations agents impose upon social
order and the material conditions of their environment that inform or otherwise
give shape to their social practices. Tat environment, in which the legal actor is
emplaced, includes both physical and social phenomena in actual space and the
corporeality of the body.
Since agents cannot shed their bodies, their representations and social
practices are always mediated through their corporeality. In this way, the body is an
integral part of the dialectical relations underlying the production and experience
of law. Laws are the lived secretions of agents whose bodies are emplaced in
a relational, social space. Laws are extensions of, and act upon, agents’ bodies,
enacting a social order that assigns bodies proper places, experiences, and roles in

1.
2.

(Oxford University Press, 2018).
Joshua David Michael Shaw is a PhD student in law at Osgoode Hall Law School,
York University.
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the topology of the community. Te embodiment of law is thereby a crucial part
to the study of law and society, in that the ways in which the body bears the efects
of experiences and enacts law feshes out our theoretical and interdisciplinary
understanding. Embodiment challenges perverse ideologies of liberal legal orders
that deny laws’ corporeal core, and the phenomenological relations undergirding
it, allowing us to grasp the contours of its material attachments to sociality and
cognize alternate arrangements.
Anastasia Chamberlen’s Embodying Punishment: Emotions, Identities, and
Lived Experiences in Women’s Prisons, provides a helpful illustration of laws’
embodiment, particularly in the exceptional space of the prison. Chamberlen
argues that embodiment3 is integral to understanding social phenomena generally,
but that the prison is a site in which the body is preponderate over other features
ordinarily salient to experience.4 In support of this thesis, Chamberlen describes
the ways in which embodiment manifests in the space of the prison and the
resulting expressions of self-identity among women prisoners. Critical themes
Chamberlen addresses include: (1) how the body mediated the experience of
the prison, particularly prisoners’ sense of autonomy and the experience of pain
and resilience; (2) the contribution of the body to identity formation and ways
the spatial organization of the prison were inscribed on prisoners’ bodies; and
(3) how prisoners’ self-harm manifested as a creative response to the denial of
autonomy within correctional space. Tese themes address the “somatic unity”5
of prisoners’ social experience, in that “temporal, spatial, social, and afective
dimensions of social environments”6 are lived through the body.

I. AN EMBODIED SUBJECTIVITY
Chamberlen principally relied upon “personal conversations [and] semi-structured
interviews [with], and brief observations of the everyday lives of ”7 twenty-four
ex-prisoners in the United Kingdom. All of her participants identifed as women.
Research participants were asked about their experience of prison, including their
experience of their bodies within the prison. Participants were also asked about
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

Chamberlen, supra note 1. Chamberlen defnes embodiment as “aspects of subjectivity
as constituted and felt on the bodily level” and the body as “simultaneously object
and subject” (ibid at 2). I think of embodiment—inclusive of law’s embodiment—
similarly to Chamberlen.
Ibid at 56-57, 191.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid.
Ibid at 199.
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their “background before imprisonment and their current lifestyles, essentially
asking the participants to place their prison experience within their broader life
narrative, by mapping crucial ‘moments’ in their lives.”8 Chamberlen characterized
her questions as open-ended in that she invited participants’ testimonies about
their “life-histor[ies],”9 not just their time in the prison and did not attempt to
impose structure upon participants’ stories. Tis meant listening, uncritically,
to participants, irrespective of irregularities in their accounts. Te life-history
approach also encouraged participants to avoid relying upon logics disconnected
from their experience, engaging in an “emotionally refexive discussion.”10
Interviews were transcribed, coded qualitatively, and then synthesized
to develop and ground Chamberlen’s theoretical description of the efects
of the prison on prisoners’ embodiment. Chamberlen describes this as a case
study method, in that the interviews and Chamberlen’s observations allowed
her to construct theoretical accounts of “‘how’ and ‘why’ certain experiences
or phenomena occur”11 from the “subjective stories of each participant.”12
Importantly, Chamberlen was not attempting to construct an “objective” account
of the prison, but instead relied upon the case study method to describe a plurality
of subjective experiences of the prison. Te plurality of participant perspectives
was, in part, relied upon to evaluate her theoretical interlocutors. Chamberlen
also collated those experiences, allowing their synthesis and distinction to
elucidate novel or unattended concepts that could account for the efects of the
prison on prisoners in particular contexts. In her words, Chamberlen attempted
to “create a cohesive story that expressed a clear picture of changing bodies in
prison, as well as the changing identities of women as a result of imprisonment
and other patriarchal pressures.”13 While intersubjective experience was the basis
of theory building, Chamberlen leans into the subjectivity of the case study
method, noting that theory must be open to the indeterminacy of social life and
recurring correction.14
Te method was also phenomenological, in the sense of understanding “that
the body is not only our source of existence and connection with the world;
it is also the vehicle through which we make sense of the world.”15 Chamberlen
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Ibid at 207.
Ibid.
Ibid at 208.
Ibid at 206.
Ibid.
Ibid at 219.
Ibid at 206.
Ibid at 216.
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attended to: (1) the participants’ bodies and their expressions or gestures; (2)
her own body in relation to the participants and accounts of the prison; and
(3) the “empathetic interconnection and non-verbal communication” between
Chamberlen and the participants.16 Refexive observation of the somatic features
of others and oneself were thereby important methodologically for Chamberlen
to ensure that bodies formed part of the interpretive practice of research.
In a description of her method, Chamberlen connected this embodied refexivity
to Pierre Bourdieu, who was opposed to pure theory cleaved from experience, not
only because it served her disciplinary and theoretical position, she also “found it
essential to engage in this form ... because, on many occasions, [her] participants
used [her] body as a comparative tool to express themselves.”17 Refexivity also
allowed Chamberlen to attend to the ways in which her research participants’
experiences were refected in her body—a phantasmal efect of intercorporeality.
In this way, there was a mimetic event experienced by both Chamberlen and the
participants in conversation, which augmented the subjective accounts provided
by situating the interview within a deeper sensory and perceptual experience.
Tis facilitated communication by having a reference point and allowed
Chamberlen to draw from her body to refne the interpretations reached. To this
end, Chamberlen kept a diary and feld notes that documented her refections on
her embodied experience.
Although less central, Chamberlen also relied upon a drawing method to
assist some participants with communicating during the interviews. Tis was
not systematically used, but she reports that some participants ofered to draw
to express concepts or experiences that were difcult to put into words. For
example, a participant “drew a picture at the end of the interview depicting a
female fgure with an amorphous and asymmetrical body constrained and barred
within a box.”18 Alternatively, participants showed Chamberlen their scars or
referred to songs to express themselves.19 Chamberlen does not explain how
this information was specifcally incorporated into the theory-building, but it
appears that she does not distinguish between it and other information. In this
way, the open-ended approach to interviews was used to generate theory from
the lived experiences of prisoners, irrespective of how that was communicated,
suggesting that drawing and reference to other sensory experiences could assist in
the study of embodiment.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Ibid at 219.
Ibid at 217.
Ibid at 177.
Ibid.
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Altogether, the combination of interview, observation, and drawing methods
is shaped by a feminist methodology. Chamberlen relies upon a feminist
methodology in that her subject matter is a gendered experience of social
phenomena. Her feminist methodology also attends to the ways in which power is
diferentially structured between the researcher and research participants, assumes
a self-critical perspective entailing ongoing introspection and revision, and takes
the lived experiences of its subjects seriously in the construction of theory.20
Chamberlen also notes that a feminist methodology is one that is concerned with
the positionality of the researcher, drawing from their lived experience in the
course of research and in their interpretation of results.21 As a result, Chamberlen’s
feminist methodology is “politically conscious,”22 seeking to identify and
intervene in structures that produce and reproduce gender inequality. A feminist
methodology, then, is an approach to planning, synthesizing, and fnding
meaning within research that gives efect to a politically conscious project of
emancipating society from relations of violence and domination exacted by men:
a structure salient to the experience of women in prisons.

II. THE SOMATIC UNITY
Chamberlen challenges the idea of the prison as merely a machine of confnement.
Instead, she considers the “prison as a fuid, leaky phenomenon, and an
institutional practice that incorporates more than confnement within the walls of
a specifc establishment.”23 Prisoners are imbedded in a carceral mesh, to borrow
from Loïc Wacquant,24 that is continuous with sociality external to the prison’s
built environment. Te built prison is indeed porous, in the sense that it is part of
a broader socio-spatial system that ceaselessly mediates prisoners’ experience and
self-understanding. Correctional staf, visitors, and artefacts of media exchange
norms with prisoners, always tethering them dialectically to spaces outside the
prison’s walls. Te prison also forms part of a time-space assemblage, in that the
prisoner does not come to the prison denuded of prior, embodied experience,
allowing prisoners to bring experiences that afect their encounters with the
prison and the encounters of others. Further, the constellation of spatializations at
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

Ibid at 219.
Ibid at 190, 217-18.
Ibid at 220.
Ibid at 1.
See “Deadly Symbiosis: When Ghetto and Prison Meet and Mesh” (2001) 3
Punishment & Soc’y 95.
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work in the prison do not end upon release—the efects of the prison are retained
through embodiment, and homologous structures and practices external to the
built prison re-inscribe those efects. In this way, prisoners form part of a dynamic
temporal and spatial order irrespective of their confnement, which continuously
shapes and reshapes their relations to their bodies. Although Chamberlen does
not use the terminology of “assemblage,” I believe her use of descriptors “leaky”
and “fuid” indicate she would agree that the prison, and prisoners, forms part of
an assemblage that extends across space and time.
Te prison’s dynamism was demonstrated in the interviews with the
prisoners who referred to changes in their bodies across their life-course to bring
their “bodies and identities” into focus.25 Prisoners also reported hypervigilance
with respect to their bodies because the socio-spatial organization of the prison
marked a signifcant transformation in experience. Prisoners often came to prison
with substance dependence suddenly cut of during incarceration, or in states
of nutritional deprivation satiated by routine provision of food, resulting in
changes that heightened awareness of their bodies. For example, some prisoners
reported experiencing menstruation after a prolonged absence because of
relatively nutritious food and distance from drugs within the prison.26 Prisons
also deprived prisoners of activities and mobility, and introduced unending and
loud noise, which focused prisoners’ attention on their embodied responses
within the prison. Some prisoners said they felt desirable for the frst time in
a long while, but greater awareness of one’s body was not altogether a positive
experience.27 Chamberlen argues that the “prison refocuses the attention of
women on their bodies, and invites the prisoner to start thinking of herself
and lifestyle in embodied ways,” but the “medicalizing focus, and paradoxical
combination of care and punishment in custody, combine[d] to exacerbate [a]
painful experience.”28 Tis produced ambivalent, at best, or harmful experiences
of the body, in that prisoners were constantly reminded of “their spatial and
temporal regulation and incapacitation, [and] of the pathologization of their
bodies.”29 Further, the “perpetual changeability”30 of the body within the prison,
prevented self-control in the sense of forming boundaries to defne one’s self
in relation to others. Chamberlen relied upon Drew Leder’s concept of the
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Chamberlen, supra note 1 at 58.
Ibid at 67-70.
Ibid at 84-86.
Ibid at 91-92.
Ibid at 99.
Ibid at 100.
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“dys-appearing body” to explain the paradoxical efect of a body conspicuously
felt within the prison—or what Chamberlen refers to as “regained awareness”—
whilst simultaneously losing agency to alienation.31
Chamberlen concludes the book with a description of how self-harm is
demonstrative of prisoners’ embodiment of the punishment-body relation;32
the punishment-body relation is understood as the body’s dialectical relation,
materially and discursively, to the prison environment. In particular, Chamberlen
attends to how pain—pain of self-harm and of punishment—intersect and afect
prisoner’s experience.33 Numerous research participants reported experiences of
self-harm, mediated through and borne by their bodies, as a means of coping
with imprisonment or agency. Chamberlen argued that self-harm was “embodied
emotion work that simultaneously give[s] meaning to and express[es] the self via
the body.”34 It was a “therapeutic practice of self-healing and self-construction,
insofar as it [was] an efort to alleviate pain and preserve a sense of self.”35 Prisoners
were reminded of their corporeal existence through self-harm, which reafrmed
and produced a claim to autonomy for prisoners despite the denial of autonomy
by the spatial organization of the prison itself. It is here that some prisoners
ofered to draw, or show their scars, to express their feelings, overcoming the
incommunicability of such an experience.36
Altogether, studying the embodiment of punishment necessitated a study
of the somatic unity of prisoners’ experience, in the sense that the “temporal,
spatial, social, and afective dimensions of [the prison’s] social environment….”37
had to be understood as concurrent processes lived through, and inscribed upon,
prisoners’ bodies. Te combination of interviews, observation, and drawing
allowed Chamberlen to engage refexively with that somatic unity as an emergent
property or object of analysis with respect to each prisoner’s subjectivity and
translate the summation of those experiences into a theoretical account of
punishment. Tat account acknowledged the inseparability of the body from
social experience, and the context-specifc ways in which the prison’s organization
acted upon, and was inscribed within, prisoners’ bodies.

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Ibid at 61.
Ibid at 175.
Ibid at 169-71.
Ibid at 175.
Ibid.
Ibid at 177.
Ibid at 4.
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III. THE PLACE OF LAW
Te prison in Embodying Punishment appears as a lawless space; not in the
sense that illegality pervades the prison, but rather in the lack of reference to
law. Chamberlen is a criminologist whose principal interest, in this project at
least, was studying prisoners’ subjectivity in the prison as a space and as an
institution of social practices. Given this disciplinary focus, it is unfair to expect
a discussion of law. But from the perspective of law and society scholars, I believe
it is important to refect upon Chamberlen’s intervention in the prison as an
example of how legal consciousness and experience can be studied through a
phenomenological method as an embodied social fact. By understanding that
implicit to Chamberlen’s study, one’s placement, condition of treatment and
punishment, and potential release in or from prison, among other things, are in
part the product of laws, I think a law and society scholar should be able to sense
its methodological utility in studying law. It is from this perspective that I think
Embodying Punishment is a helpful illustration of laws’ embodiment, irrespective
of whether Chamberlen specifcally raises the question of law in her analysis.
For example, when Chamberlen discusses the disempowerment caused
by the “prison’s refusal to allow women to exercise decision-making over their
treatment,” she is implicitly referring to the legal complex within English prisons
that conveys especial authority to prison physicians to determine the course of
medical treatment.38 Te legal complex is heterogeneous, formed from disparate
processes and powers, which, taken together, have an emergent efect on prisoners’
embodiment. Elsewhere, James Woodall, Rachael Dixey, and Jane South describe
the systematic depredation of prisoners’ autonomy in prison health care settings
where “the structured nature of the regime situated individuals in a routine that
relentlessly resulted in feelings of monotony and boredom” and the loss of a sense
of control.39 Chamberlen reaches a similar conclusion, and goes further, stating
that “women are frstly stripped of their individuality and self-control as prisoners
and secondly as patients.”40 For many prisoners, due to social marginality, the
prison is often the frst time health services are easily accessible and many undergo
changes in their bodies that can demarcate health and pain (e.g., withdrawal
from substances, taking up substances, incidence of menstruation). Chamberlen’s

38. Ibid at 96.
39. “Control and Choice in English Prisoners: Developing Health-Promoting Prisoners” (2013)
29 Health Promotion Intl 474 at 477.
40. Chamberlen, supra note 1 at 96.
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interview participants reported that they, and others, often came to be reliant
upon medical intervention as they experienced these bodily changes.
Prison physicians and their health teams were described as contributing to
this reliance with the administration of methadone, which was often to prisoners’
an “overall rehabilitative disadvantage in order to keep them quiet and thus
manageable in the prison environment.”41 Te depredation of autonomy and
reliance of prisoners on health care interventions operates alongside permissions
that establish that English prisoners can only obtain treatment approved by prison
physicians, and that mental illness provides maximal authority to administer
treatment as physicians assess is needed. Te prison setting can thereby be
understood as producing a space of “slow death,”42 to borrow a term from
necropolitics, in that health care is administered in a way that “constitute[s] the
prisoner’s docile and quietened body” in an enactment of “forced compliance”
that constrains their social plasticity.43 Tis not only leads to the compelling
account of how prison, as an architectural and institutional space, regulates the
experience and expression of the body, but also suggests for me how sociolegal
practices enact law in the prison and their connection to embodiment.
A law and society scholar might rely upon a similar case study, with a
similar set of qualitative and phenomenological methodologies, whilst attending
to the specifc contribution of the legal form to the production of prisoners’
embodiment. I suspect that would require additional questions that specifcally
attempt to apprehend prisoners’ lived experience of the processes, powers, and
permissions of law, as those are enacted in the sociolegal practices of correctional
staf and prisoners. It might also require a theory of law, which can conceptualize
the legal form, its production, and its efects on and meaning for social actors.
But these are simple reconfgurations of the general methodological project
demonstrated by Chamberlen. Te corporeality of law is not distant from the
corporeality of space or institutions—indeed, as we consider their shared basis
in social phenomena, like in the exceptional space of the prison, we come to
realize our materiality is imbricated in law, space, and institutions. Chamberlen
may not have spotlighted law’s constituent part in the picture, but law was latent
in Embodying Punishment and awaits elaboration by law and society scholars
determined to take seriously the embodied experience of law.

41. Ibid.
42. Billy-Ray Belcourt, “Meditations on Reserve Life, Biosociality, and the Taste of
Non-Sovereignty” (2018) 8 Settler Colonial Stud 1 at 4.
43. Chamberlen, supra note 1 at 96.
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To that end, elaborating upon Chamberlen’s work, law and society scholars
should embrace research as an embodied fact. By saying this, I mean that the
researcher should apprehend senses that arise in encounters with the participant
through intersubjective corporeality. Since the law and society scholar, like the
participant, is not disembodied, relevant senses might indeed arise from the
researcher’s body. Tis is a signifcant part of the phenomenological method,
in that the lived experience of talking to, interviewing, or observing someone else
may allow the law and society researcher to refect on their own bodies and learn
about the nomoi we inhabit. Diarizing the hot fashes, butterfies, and excrement
of our bodies in encounters with others is a meaningful part to describing the
dialectical relation of law to our bodies. From there law and society scholars can
construct theories of law that are felt, accepting laws’ corporeal core.

